Russian interference with GPS signals in Finnmark has long been utilized as one of the clearest examples of evidence concerning Russian hybrid warfare against Norway. The consequences of the interference have been many and extensive, such as for aircraft navigation and commercial fishing. Noticeably, Finnmark Chief of Police Ellen Katrine Hætta has drawn attention to the interference with GPS signals, and has declared this as being the most obvious use by the Russians of what is also called composite instruments.
As a journalist working for NRK until 2023, I also regarded the Russian jamming and spoofing that hit Finnmark as a clear example of Russian hybrid warfare. But is this actually about hybrid warfare?
On February 5 this year, the Norwegian Intelligence Service presented its annual open threat assessment. At that time, the Director of the Norwegian Intelligence Service Nils Andreas Stensønes downplayed the drama. He said that there is no reason at all to believe that this was about a desire to inflict harm on Norway. The disruptions to GPS in Finnmark in recent years have been due to Russian protective measures for their own weapons systems, not targeted attacks against Norwegian civil air traffic and other GPS users on the Norwegian side, he said.
Russia has therefore not had any desire to harm Norway. Is it correct then to say that the Russians are conducting a hybrid operation, i.e. a form of warfare using unconventional means? I think not. Nonetheless, NRK, Forsvarets Forum (‘Forum of the Norwegian Defense Forces’) and other media continue to do so, contributing to increasing tensions between Norway and Russia in a turbulent time. Is that wise?
Unfortunately, there are several similar examples. In the newspaper Aftenposten on February 27 last year, Ola Kaldager, a Norwegian officer and former head of the intelligence service, was quoted as saying that train derailments between Narvik and Kiruna were a “signal to us that our opponents have the capacity, ability and will if they want to.” Kaldager received support in the article from naval lieutenant commander and researcher at the Norwegian Naval Academy, Tor Ivar Strømmen. The train derailments were investigated as possible sabotage, and the international press took an interest. 80 percent of the raw material for Europe’s iron production is transported by train on this stretch. The Financial Times reported that the Swedish security service Säpo was involved, and that Säpo believed foreign powers – read Russia – could be behind it. One year after the derailments, the Swedish Accident Investigation Board had completely finished its investigation: Hard-packed snow and damage to a train wheel were the cause of the derailments. The conclusions attracted far less attention. The experts, who had previously said that the cause was hybrid warfare, were not confronted with what they had previously claimed. The public was left with the impression that the derailments were part of Russian hybrid warfare, which they were not.
During Arendal Week this autumn, PST chief Beate Gangåsclaimed that pro-Russian actors had hacked the control system of a fish hatchery in Bremanger in Western Norway this spring. This led to valves being opened automatically and 500 litres of water per second flooding out from the hatchery for the next four hours.
Later, PST claimed that a hacker alliance with ties to Russia had posted a video on Telegram with images of the hatcheryfacility’s control panel, and that this video also claimed responsibility for the hacking. But does this mean that it can then be concluded that Russia was, in this way, waging hybrid war against Norway?
An editorial about the matter published in Aftenposten does not state outright that this was state-organized. It is however claimed that there could be three other explanations. The operation could have been carried out either by a group with close Russian state ties, by a group with loose ties to Russian state bodies, or by a group with no Russian state ties at all.
The Russian embassy in Oslo requested evidence from PST of Russian connections to the hacking. PST failed to uncover who was behind the hacking. PST thereby dropped the investigation. That what might have appeared to be a Russian hybrid operation, is not necessarily the case in this instance.
Possibly, the cases receiving the most attention that are related, and commonly referred to as hybrid attacks in Norway are the cyber operations against the Storting (Norwegian Parliament). At the end of August 2020, it was discovered that someone had accessed several email accounts at the Storting. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, went public and blamed Russia. Diplomatically, it is a rarity to make such accusations publicly, which means that the evidence had to be strong.
In March 2021, the alarm went off again at the Storting when someone had managed to drain the entire email account (totalling 4,000) of the Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Michael Tetzschner. This time, the responsibility was publicly blamed on the Chinese. In this instance, the evidence must have also been strong.
For the sake of good order, it is nonetheless important to highlight that Norway and many other Western countries are doing exactly the same thing. Norway has long carried out cyber operations against the political leadership in Russia, as has been revealed in Snowden documents. This type of computer espionage is nowadays regarded as ordinary espionage, not hybrid warfare.
This is not to say that Russia has not carried out sabotage and other non-military measures against Norway in recent years to show its dissatisfaction with Norway’s Ukraine policy. This has frequently also been the case elsewhere in Europe. A major problem is documentation, which the public also demands, but which the authorities struggle to present, partly due to the secrecy of operations. The Russians cover their tracks well. Where the Norwegian Intelligence Service and the PST are concerned, if they were to publish their findings, this could prove disastrous for them with regard to any further endeavours.
In September, Oslo Airport was closed for several hours after alleged drones were seen over the airport. What is publicly known about the investigation was that the police were unable to prove that there had been drones over the airport, much less a Russian connection to the alleged sightings. The police dropped the case. Possibly, it was just a false alarm.
Head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service Nils Andreas Stensønes said during Arendal Week this autumn that Russia had not tried to significantly influence the parliamentary and Sami elections, as many had feared in advance, and as Russia has done in other countries. Stensønes also said that it had been proven that the much-discussed cable breaks in the Baltic Sea were deliberate sabotage.
The intelligence chief maintained that we must avoid unnecessary self-intimidation by apportioning blame too quickly. That will only serve those who want to harm Norway, he said. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that Russian hybrid operations in Norway have been going on for a long time. Nothing new there. As an example, in 1967, the KGB contacted a Norwegian journalist to get him to write articles in the Norwegian press according to KGB’s wishes.
I agree with the Chief of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, Nils Andreas Stensønes, that we must take a sober approach to hybrid threats. The question is whether we actually do so.
The police in Troms and Nordre Nordland registered over 500 suspicious incidents last year. There were suspicious use of antennas, vehicles, drones and observations of suspicious tourists. To me, it sounds like the result of a hysteria where enemies are seen behind every bush. Could this “zeitgeist” (general spirit of the current times we live in) flourishing with exaggerated suspicions have been created by the media, at least partly on a failing foundation? Unfortunately, I think so.
